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Abstract
During the recent financial crisis, 325 U.S. banks failed whereas only 24 banks failed from 20002006. It is important to identify how banks’ operations and changes in the economic environment
might influence the total risk level faced by U.S. banking institutions in order to avoid the
number of bank failures experienced during the recent recession. This study analyzes publicly
traded banks in the U.S. from 1978 to 2010. Various accounting ratios and macroeconomic
indicators are used as proxies for the effects of individual bank operations and changes in the
economic environment. Total risk, as measured by the standard deviation of ROA and ROE, is
regressed against the accounting ratios and economic indicators to identify the important sources
of total risk. Bank size, the equity to asset ratio, allowance for loan loss ratio, liquidity ratio, loan
to asset ratio, growth in real GDP, growth in the money supply and the interest rate spread all
appear to be significantly associated with total risk.
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I.

Introduction
From 2000-2006, only 24 banks failed in the United States, yet from 2007-2010, which

was the time that coincided with the recent recession and financial crisis, 325 banks failed in the
U.S. (FDIC). Depositors and investors have a significant interest in the health of banking
institutions. When a bank fails, depositors stand to lose out on any money that is not insured by
the FDIC and equity investors will undoubtedly incur substantial losses. It is important to
identify possible determinants of total risk for banking companies in order to avoid the losses
associated with a bank’s failure. This research paper aims to analyze the association that changes
in the economic environment and firm specific accounting ratios have with the total risk level
faced by banks. The inclusion of economic indicators as possible sources of total risk for banks
is the main contribution of this study.
Some of the existing literature on bank risk looks at how accounting ratios relate to
market risk for banks. Market risk is the risk that affects the entire banking industry, such as
changes in the economic environment like recessions. Firm-specific risk is the risk that is unique
to each individual bank. Sources of firm-specific risk include business and financial risk.
Business risk includes risk that arises from a firm’s operations like generating a sufficient
amount of income to cover operating expenses or even meeting the pension obligations for
retirees(Mayo, 2008). Financial risk addresses the risk associated with management’s decisions
or ability and a company’s financial strength (Mayo, 2008). Basically, firm-specific risk is the
risk that arises from the operations, performance or managerial decisions at each bank. When
added together, market risk and firm-specific risk combine to form total risk. Total risk is the risk
measure that is used in this study and it is appropriate because it includes the risks that affect

3

each individual bank as well as market risk, or the risk that affects the entire banking industry
(Agusman et al., 2008).
The results of this research can help to minimize some of the consequences associated
with bank failures. If it is found that changes in the economic environment are in fact
significantly related to a bank’s total risk level, then when indicators suggest the country is going
through an economic downturn, banks can adjust their operations accordingly to protect against
the higher risk level. Further implications of this study relate to the accounting ratios used as
proxies for the various sources of risk for banks. The statistically significant accounting ratios
that increase risk can be identified and bank management can closely monitor these measures, or
regulators can impose stricter regulations on the values for these metrics. Similarly, the
statistically significant ratios that reduce risk can be used as tools to strengthen the financial
health of a bank and help it to be more resilient during a recession.
Section II outlines some of the existing research in this area where changes in the
economic environment have not been considered as a possible source of total risk for banks. The
hypotheses of this study and the variables used in the regression models are explained in Section
III. Section IV covers the data and methodology used in this study, Section V covers the results
and Section VI contains the conclusions of this research.
II.

Literature Review

It has been noted that large, publicly traded institutions possess a large percentage of assets in
the banking industry and “present the greatest risk to the deposit-insurance fund and to the
stability of the banking system” (Pettway and Sinkey, 1980). The rising number of bank failures
in the U.S. is a cause for analyzing the risk of banking companies (Mansur et al., 1993). The risk
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level of a banking institution can be determined with the use of accounting data, which is a tool
used to distinguish sound from unsound banking (Pettway and Sinkey, 1980).
The majority of studies attempt to identify which accounting and financial ratios prove to be
the sources of market risk and total risk. The consensus amongst the literature has been to
measure market risk with beta and total risk by the standard deviation of returns (Lee and
Brewer, 1985; Jahankhani and Lynge, 1980; Mansur and Zitz, 1993; Pettway, 1976; Agusman et
al., 2008) . But in the findings of a comparison study, accounting and financial ratios better
explain total risk as opposed to market risk (Jahankhani and Lynge, 1980).
An important distinction about a bank’s risk assessment concerns the usefulness of the risk
measure for the purpose it is being used. A measure of market risk would be important for an
equity investor because the market measure of risk, beta, is useful in determining the riskiness of
a particular stock that might be added to an investment portfolio (Agusman et al., 2008).
However, a bank regulator would be more concerned with a measure of total risk, like the
standard deviation of return on assets or equity, to assess the financial health and risk of default
for a banking institution (Agusman et al., 2008). Agusman et al. (2008) addresses these
differences in a study analyzing the link between accounting ratios and capital market measures
of risk for 46 Asian banks from 1998-2003. In their study, the standard deviation of return on
assets is found to be a significant proxy for total risk and the loan-loss-reserves-to-gross-loans
variable is significantly related to total risk.
Risk is said to be strongly influenced by a bank’s management decisions and those decisions
can be reflected in a bank’s financial statements which make accounting ratios a viable proxy for
such decisions (Jahankhani and Lynge, 1980; Lee and Brewer, 1985). A study of 95 commercial
banks and bank holding companies from 1972 to 1976 finds that the dividend payout ratio,
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variability of deposits and earnings, the equity to total asset ratio, loan loss reserves ratio and a
liquidity measure are all statistically significant in predicting a measure of total risk (Jahankhani
and Lynge, 1980). In fact, the accounting ratios used in this study are able to explain 43% of the
variation in total risk for a bank as opposed to 25% of the variability in market risk, suggesting
that accounting ratios are better predictors of total risk measures than market risk measures
(Jahankhani and Lynge, 1980).
Another comparison study of 44 U.S. banks from 1979-1982 finds that accounting ratios
demonstrate more consistent results in relation to total risk despite a slight change in the model.
The equity to asset ratio, foreign income, foreign deposit exposure, volatile liabilities and the net
position of market rate assets are all significantly related to total risk (Lee and Brewer, 1985).
In a study of 59 U.S. banks from 1986-1990, only the cash and due from banks liquidity ratio
proves to be significant in relation to total risk (Mansur and Zitz, 1993). Variables that are
significant in some time periods are not always found to be significant in studies of different time
periods. The equity to deposit and loan loss reserve variables are insignificant in this study while
significant in others. Mansur and Zitz (1993) attribute the difference in results across studies to
the use of different banks and different ratios. A study spanning a longer time period could help
mitigate some of the variation in the results of the existing literature that can be attributed to
looking at different time periods.
An overview of the literature shows that the economy has not been considered a source of
risk for banking companies. Also, many studies are concerned with how financial ratios are
related to market risk, or the risk that cannot be mitigated by an investor through diversification.
The goal of the current study is not only to include the economy as a source of risk for banks, but
also to use a measure of total risk instead of market risk. Market risk does not incorporate firm-
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specific risk. Firm-specific risk is the risk that is unique to each bank and it is caused by
management decisions, policies and operations. A measure of total risk not only accounts for
market risk, it also accounts for firm-specific risk which is important when looking at banks
because different banks use different assets with different risk levels and they have different
lending qualifications.
III.

Hypothesis, Methodology and Variables

The literature discussed above leads to the general hypothesis that changes in the economic
environment, as measured by macroeconomic indicators, are significantly related to total risk, in
addition to bank decisions, which are reflected in accounting ratios from financial statement data.
The model being used to test this hypothesis is:
SDROE = β0 - β1Size - β2Equity/Asset + β3 Loan Loss - β4Liquidity + β5 Loan/Asset
- β6Dividend Payout - β7GDP Growth +/- β8M2 Growth
+ β9Interest Rate Gap+ εi
where the trailing three year standard deviation of return on equity (SDROE) is the dependent
variable and it serves as a measure for total risk. An alternative measure of total risk is the
trailing three year standard deviation of return on assets (SDROA) which will also be used in this
study as a means to test the robustness of the results. These trailing three year standard deviation
of return variables measure the volatility in a banking firm’s earnings ratios in an attempt to
capture the total risk level for a bank that is not affected by short term fluctuations. The data are
analyzed in four different models: 1) the base model, 2) a model with fixed-effects for time, 3) a
model with fixed-effects for each firm and 4) then a model with fixed-effects for both time and
each firm. The fixed-effect variables are dummy variables designed to capture any unobserved
characteristics that are unique to each year and each firm. To measure the fixed-effects of time in
7

this study, a dummy variable is used for each year resulting in a total of 33 time fixed-effect
variables for each of the 33 years in this study. The variables measure the unobserved
characteristics that are unique to each distinct time period and which cannot be captured by other
variables in the model. Historically, banks have attempted to mask their true risk levels by
temporarily lowering their debt just before the end of a reporting period which results in a
skewed representation of their true risk level (Kelly et al., 2010). The time fixed-effect variables
can highlight any specific years that exhibit substantially higher risk levels, particularly those
leading up to the recent financial crisis. The firm fixed-effect variables are used to capture the
unobserved characteristics, such as management decisions and corporate culture, which are
unique to each individual firm and yet, impact the total risk level faced by that bank. Such
important factors cannot be accounted for with any quantitative metric, so a dummy variable is
used to capture the cumulative effect of these factors on total risk. Each of these models will be
analyzed using linear regressions to test the significance of each model and the individual
variables.
Table 1 provides variable definitions and the expected signs. The independent variables
represent accounting data from financial statements and macroeconomic indicators to reflect
changes in the economic environment. All the variables reflect quarterly values.
Size
The size variable is the log of total assets for each bank. The expected relationship
between bank size and total risk is negative. Large banks tend to be more diversified which
allows them to engage in riskier and potentially more profitable lending without increasing risk
because of a diversification advantage (Demsetz and Strahan, 1997). Likewise, smaller firms
face greater risk because they are not as diversified, which helps mitigate risk.
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Table 1: Variable Definitions and Expected Signs
Variable

Formula
Log of Total Assets

Definition
Accounts for the size of a banking
institution

Loan Loss

Total Shareholder Equity
/ Total Assets
Allowance for Loan Losses
/ Gross Loans

Identifies the percent of assets that
shareholders contribute
The percent of loans a bank does
not expect to collect upon

Liquidity

Cash and Due from Banks
/ Total Assets

Size
Equity Asset

Loan Asset

GDP Growth

Gross Loans / Total Assets
(Common Stock Dividends
+ Preferred Stock
Dividends) / Net Income
GDP of the Current Quarter
/ GDP of the Previous
Quarter

M2 Growth

Money Supply of the
Current Quarter / Money
Supply of the Previous
Quarter

Dividend Payout

Interest Rate Gap
SDROE
SDROA

Expected
Sign
+

A measure of a bank's ability to
absorb unexpected changes in its
asset and liability accounts
The percent of total assets which
are held in loans outstanding

+

Management’s expectations about
future net income

-

The quarterly growth in GDP

-

The quarterly growth in Money
Supply (M2)

-

+/-

Measures the interest rate spread
Yield on the 10 year
between the 10 year Treasury and
Treasury Bond - Federal
the Federal Funds Rate
+
Funds Rate
The standard deviation of the three year trailing return on equity Dependent
The standard deviation of the three year trailing return on assets
Dependent

Equity to Asset Ratio
This variable is the ratio of total shareholder equity to total assets. This variable identifies
the percent of total assets which shareholders contribute. It is expected that a negative
relationship exists between the equity to asset ratio and total risk because a larger percentage of
operations are funded by raised capital rather than borrowed funds, which are accompanied by
the added cost of interest expense (Pettway, 1976; Jahankhani and Lynge, 1980; Agusman et al.,
9

2008). This variable was found to be perfectly correlated with the equity to deposit ratio which
has also been used in the literature, but this study opts to use the equity to asset ratio due to its
more frequent use as observed by the author of this study.
Allowance for Loan Losses
The allowance for loan losses serves as a proxy for credit risk. It represents the percent
of a bank’s loans that are expected to result in losses due to slow payment and default. It is an
indicator of the quality of a bank’s loan portfolio. A larger ratio indicates that a greater percent of
a bank’s loans are bad and expected to default, meaning the bank will not get repaid and the loan
becomes a loss (Mansur and Zitz, 1993). Thus, it is anticipated that a positive relationship with
total risk exists for this variable.
Liquidity
The liquidity variable is the ratio of cash and due from banks to total assets. As its name
indicates, it is a proxy for liquidity risk because this variable measures the percent of assets
which are held in very liquid and short term assets like cash. It is believed that a higher ratio,
which indicates greater liquidity, translates into less total risk, so liquidity is expected to be
negatively related to total risk (Agusman et al., 2008; Jahankhani and Lynge, 1980; Mansur and
Zitz, 1993). Firms that maintain higher levels of liquidity are expected to be able to absorb
unexpected losses in the short run, due to a greater amount of liquid assets available, and avoid
the risk of illiquidity.
Loan to Asset Ratio
This is a proxy for liquidity risk and it measures the percent of assets which are held in
outstanding loans (Mansur and Zitz, 1993). A high ratio is an indicator of potential liquidity
issues because loans are not usually callable and they tie up funds which could otherwise be held
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in more liquid assets, like cash, and used to address unexpected losses. It is expected that the
loan to asset ratio is positively related to total risk because the issuance of loans reduces the
amount of capital available to meet short term or unexpected obligations which might give rise to
liquidity issues (Agusman et al., 2008; Mansur and Zitz, 1993). This variable was found to be
highly correlated with the loan to deposit ratio, but much like the equity to asset ratio, and
because of the more frequent use of the loan to asset ratio in prior studies, it is used in this study.
Dividend Payout
This ratio is calculated as the percent of net income paid out in dividends. This variable is
expected to reflect the bank management’s expectations about future net income because most
firms want to achieve stable dividends and they set the dividends to be paid amount at a value
which they are confident they can cover with net income (Lee and Brewer, 1985). Thus, firms
that have a higher dividend payout ratio are more confident that they can generate higher levels
of net income and cover the dividends paid amount. It is expected that a higher ratio, which
means a firm’s management is confident they can consistently generate sufficient levels of net
income, will lead to less total risk and thus, exhibit a negative relationship.
GDP Growth
GDP Growth is the first of the macroeconomic indicator variables. It reflects changes in
the economic environment as it measures the quarterly change in real GDP. This variable has
been used as a proxy for economic activity as a ratio of less than one indicates a decline in
economic activity (Jokipii and Milne, 2007). It is expected that banks will face greater risk
during periods of contracting economic activity, so the GDP Growth variable is expected to be
negatively related to total risk.

11

M2 Growth
This variable measures the quarterly growth in the money supply. Banks generate profit
off of interest income they receive from issuing loans. As M2 grows, and more money circulates
in the economy, banks should be able to make more loans and generate more profits which will
help them accumulate reserves that can be used to improve the credit quality and financial
strength of the bank. Larger profits would allow a bank greater financial flexibility to use extra
reserves as a buffer against liquidity problems or for the purpose of deleveraging. Such an
argument would suggest that growth in the money supply is negatively related to total risk, but a
strong argument can also be made for the contrary. The Federal Reserve sometimes chooses to
inject money into the economy during periods of uncertainty in an effort to build confidence. So
when markets are volatile and confidence is low amongst individuals, the Fed can opt for
monetary “easing” which might suggest that growth in M2 occurs during highly volatile or high
risk periods. This argument would suggest a positive relationship exists between total risk and
growth in the money supply and thus, an anticipated relationship between growth in M2 and total
risk cannot be determined.
Interest Rate Gap
The interest rate gap is the spread, or difference, between the yield on the 10 year U.S.
Treasury bond and the federal funds rate at the end of each quarterly period. The yield on the 10
year Treasury bond is a benchmark for long term interest rates while the federal funds rate
reflects the rate that member banks charge each other for overnight loans (short term). This
variable captures the inflation risk present in the economy (Snyder, 2005). When uncertainty
about inflation arises, it tends to have more influence over long term interest rates instead of
short term rates. As the risk of inflation becomes more serious, investors will demand a higher
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yield on long term investment options because of the influence that inflating prices could have in
a ten year period. On the other hand, a fear of inflation might not cause the same increase in
short term interest rates because of the lesser degree of influence that inflation can have in the
short run versus the long run. It is expected that a larger spread between short term and long term
rates will indicate greater uncertainty about inflation and thus, be positively related to total risk.
IV.

Data
The data used in this study comes from the Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS)

online database at the University of Pennsylvania’s Wharton School of Business. This study
includes a sample of 326 U.S. banks that are analyzed over the quarterly periods from 19782010. The banks used in this study are publicly traded and classified as Major Banks of the
Finance Industry by the Nasdaq Exchange. This study does not follow all 326 companies for
each quarter from 1978-2010. Some companies were not incorporated in 1978 and do not enter
the study until the 1980’s, 1990’s or 2000’s while other companies appear in the study from the
very beginning but then leave the study when they are acquired or fail. By allowing for the
inclusion of companies that are present for only a fraction of the time period of this study, the
risk of having the results of this study influenced by a survival bias can be overcome. Only 21
companies are represented in every year of the study, but if this study were limited to only these
21 companies it would not capture what occurred at struggling or failing institutions that were
acquired by other banks or left to fail. Because of the trailing nature of the SDROE variable, the
included companies in this study must have been incorporated for at least three years so that this
variable could be calculated. Thus, companies that enter at some point after 1978 are beginning
their fourth year of incorporation when they appear in this study because they first need to record
three years of return on equity and asset data.
13

V.

Results

The summary statistics for the independent variables are presented in Table 2 and the
regression results of this study can be found in Table 3.
Table 2: Summary Statistics
Variables

Minimum

Maximum

Mean

Std. Deviation

Size

6.875

11.374

8.381

0.684

Equity/Asset

0.003

0.262

0.087

0.023

Loan Loss

0

0.114

0.015

0.008

Liquidity

0

0.410

0.049

0.050

Loans/Asset

0

.948

0.560

0.267

Dividend Payout

-1.999

1.997

0.275

0.359

GDP Growth

0.980

1.039

1.006

0.007

M2 Growth

0.996

1.057

1.014

0.008

IR Gap

-6.060

3.850

1.476

1.513

SDROE

7.16E-05

4.011

0.019

0.107

SDROA

3.73E-06

0.326

0.001

0.004

For the purpose of the interpretation of the results, Model 1 is used. In this model the core
variables are regressed against total risk (SDROE) without the use of time or firm fixed-effect
variables. Regression results are also included for the four models with the trailing three year
standard deviation of return on assets (SDROA) as the dependent variable. The inclusion of these
models is a test for the robustness of the results because SDROA has also been used as an
alternative measure of total risk (Agusman et al., 2008).
The coefficient on the size variable is negative and statistically significant. This suggests
that larger firms, or those with more total assets, experience less total risk. The results of Model
1 produce the expected negative relationship between bank size and total risk. In the SDROE
regressions, the negative relationship was a consistent result except in Model 3, but the
14

coefficient for size in that model was statistically insignificant. The results for this variable are
the opposite when using a regression with the SDROA as the dependent variable. In these
models, size has a positive and significant result with total risk. When comparing the regressions
with the different dependent variables, larger banks experience less volatility with respect to
return on equity, but greater volatility with respect to return on assets.
The equity to asset ratio yielded the expected sign and was statistically significant in all
models. The relationship between this ratio and total risk is negative, meaning that firms who
utilize more equity to finance their operations experience less total risk. This seems intuitive
because equity capital is cheaper than the alternative of borrowed money which comes with the
added cost of interest expense. Firms that can raise more funds instead of having to borrow them
should have greater financial flexibility and be more financially sound than banks that borrow
large sums of money and are obligated to make large interest payments, even if they might be
operating at a loss.
The coefficient for the allowance for loan loss ratio is statistically significant in all
models and it has the expected positive sign. This ratio is positively related to total risk for
banks. As a measure of the expected losses and actual loan write-offs in a bank’s loan portfolio,
these results suggest that banks who estimate larger losses on loans will face more risk because
the quality of their loan portfolio is not as good.
The liquidity ratio exhibits a positive relationship with total risk which is the opposite of
what is expected. It is expected that banks who hold excess liquidity will face lower risk because
they have greater financial flexibility to meet unexpected charges or losses in the short run.
However, all of the regression models, with both dependent variables, suggest that the opposite
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is true; excess liquidity actually increases a banking firm’s total risk. It has been argued that
firms who hold excess liquidity make inefficient use of the excess capital. Excess capital is
Table 3: Regression Results
SDROE
Variables

SDROA

1

2

3

4

1

2

3

4

1.00

0.009

0.625

0.025

0.034

-0.009

0.015

-0.01

4.686**

0.03

3.194**

0.1

4.371**

-0.884

1.963*

-1.043

-0.009

-0.01

0.004

-0.009

.000

.000

.000

.000

-6.596**

-7.592**

1.571

-2.675**

-5.167**

-5.361**

3.156**

-0.91

-0.417

-0.501

-0.958

-1.098

-0.005

-0.008

-0.017

-0.021

-10.696**

-12.614**

-19.174**

-21.349**

-3.597**

-5.372**

-8.593**

-10.846**

2.472

2.213

2.801

2.3

0.112

0.099

0.113

0.092

22.150**

18.717**

24.641**

18.583**

27.520**

22.880**

25.865**

19.293**

0.094

0.093

0.219

0.22

0.005

0.004

0.008

0.006

4.665**

4.138**

9.075**

8.070**

6.454**

4.628**

8.159**

6.003**

0.027

-0.012

0.049

0.04

0.002

0.001

0.001

0.001

6.739**

-1.877

9.668

4.888**

11.316**

3.941**

6.961**

2.290*

-4.781E-6

-7.183E-6

-4.377E-6

-6.376E-6

-2.55E-7

-3.32E-7

-2.00E-7

-2.708E-7

-0.517

-0.78

-0.544

-0.794

-0.751

-0.986

-0.644

-0.876

-0.657

-0.089

-0.441

-0.12

-0.023

-0.001

-0.013

-0.001

-4.992**

-0.484

-3.764**

-0.775

-4.783**

-0.168

-2.968**

-0.165

-0.267

0.2

-0.209

0.209

-0.01

0.012

-0.005

0.012

-2.270*

1.327

-2.012*

1.603

-2.349*

2.160*

-1.204

2.470*

0.003

.000

0.001

.000

.000

-2.85E-5

.000

.-1.329E-5

4.469**

-0.219

2.703**

-0.106

8.206**

0.549

7.004**

0.263

Time Fixed-effect
Firm Fixed-effect

No

Yes

No

Yes

No

Yes

No

Yes

No

No

Yes

Yes

No

No

Yes

Yes

Adjusted R square
F Value

0.049

0.058

0.291

0.298

0.072

0.083

0.234

0.243

90.563

24.515

20.222

19.125

135.334

35.283

15.316

14.749

(Constant)
Size
Equity/Asset
Loan Loss
Liquidity
Loans/Asset
Dividend Payout
GDP Growth
M2 Growth
IR Gap

The top number for each variable is the regression coefficient.
The italicized number is the t-statistic for each variable.
Due to space limitation, the regression coefficients for each fixed-effect variable are not included
their effects are summarized in the analysis.
* significant at the .05 level
** significant at the .01 level
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allocated to weak business segments which reduces the resources available for the better
performing segments (Shim, 2010). Thus, it is not unexpected that excess liquidity will be
positively related to total risk due to the resulting inefficiencies.
In Model 1, the loan to asset ratio has the expected positive sign and is statistically
significant. This ratio is positively related to total risk for banks. Loans are not liquid assets and
banks who have a large amount of loans outstanding relative to their total assets might face a
greater risk because illiquid assets cannot be used to address unexpected charges in the short run.
The results for this variable were fairly consistent except in Model 2, when accounting for the
fixed-effects of time. In Model 2, the relationship between the loan to asset ratio and total risk
became negative but the result was statistically insignificant.
The coefficient for the dividend payout ratio never yields any significant results. It is
expected that this ratio is negatively related to total risk because this ratio can reflect
management’s expectations about future net income. Dividend amounts are declared in advance
of when they are issued, and higher dividend payout ratios could be an indicator that
management is more confident that they can generate enough net income to cover the dividends
paid amount. In most of the models, the coefficient was negative for the dividend payout ratio
meaning it is negatively related to total risk, but the results were highly insignificant.
The relationship between changes in the economic environment and total risk is
statistically significant. As expected, growth in real GDP is negatively related to total risk. As an
indicator of cyclical activity in the economy, it appears that declines in real GDP lead to greater
total risk for banks. Likewise, periods of expanding economic output coincide with lower levels
of risk for banks.

17

The anticipated effect of the growth in the money supply variable could not be
determined ex ante, but the results indicate that this variable is negatively related to total risk.
Perhaps, the injection of money into the economy by the Federal Reserve helps minimize the risk
of illiquidity. When the money supply increases, banks have access to more capital which they
can use to issue loans. The issuance of loans generates profit for banks which they can hold as
cash reserves to improve liquidity or to deleverage and reduce interest expense. Either of these
purposes could reduce total risk because they improve the financial strength of a bank.
Results for the interest rate spread variable are statistically significant and produce the
expected positive relationship with total risk. A larger spread between the 10 year Treasury bond
and the Federal Funds rate can signal growing concern about future inflation rates. Inflation is a
source of risk because it reduces the purchasing power of money which is why long term
investors would demand an inflation premium, or a higher yield on long term securities, to
compensate them for the chance that price levels in the economy could go up.
These macroeconomic indicators yield the expected and significant results in most
models that do not control for time. The inclusion of both economic variables and year fixedeffect variables leads to highly insignificant results. The year fixed-effect variables aim to
capture the unobserved characteristics that are present in each year of this study that could
influence the total risk level for a bank. Financial regulations and the economic environment can
change from year to year. Measures like the Basel Accords can be implemented which can
influence a bank’s operations and indirectly, their risk level. Likewise, the recent troubles in the
housing market that helped trigger the financial crisis could lead to a very significant change in
the risk level that banks faced in the last couple of years. But the growth in money supply and
real GDP variables might also capture some of the effects of time through naturally increasing
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trends in these values. Over the 33 year period of this study, there might exist a natural growth in
money supply or real GDP as technological advances help improve productivity and economic
output improves and it could lead to problems with multicollinearity. The reason that the
economic variables changed significance so much with the inclusion of the time fixed-effect
variables might be due to too much overlapping of the captured effects of these variables.
The year fixed-effect variables created some disturbances in the results for the economic
variables and the loan to asset ratio, but they also yielded some interesting results. The time
fixed-effect dummy variable for the year 2007 was left out of all regressions so that it could be
used as a benchmark for comparison purposes. The fixed-effect for each year before 2007 all had
negative coefficients suggesting that there was more risk in 2007 than in any of the other years.
Likewise, the coefficients for 2008, 2009 and 2010 all yielded positive coefficients suggesting
that each of those years was more risky than 2007. These years coincide with the financial crisis,
and due to the severe nature and volatility of that time period, it is expected that these years
would display the highest risk. the results for these year fixed-effect variables remain consistent
across the models.
For the firm fixed-effects, the dummy variable for Bank of America was left out of this
regression for comparison purposes. The unobserved characteristics at JPMorgan Chase produce
a negative relationship with total risk suggesting that the company is less risky than Bank of
America. However, when controlling for time and firm fixed-effects, the JPMorgan Chase fixedeffect variable is no longer significant. On the other hand, Berkshire Bancorp appears to be the
most risky bank, since the unobserved characteristics present at this bank lead to 1.072 increase
in the SDROE, which is by far the most for any bank in this study. The TrustCo Bank of New
York appears to be the least risky bank in this study as the unobserved characteristics present at
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this institution lead to a 0.042 decline in the SDROE, which is the smallest coefficient for a bank
in this study. The results for the firm fixed-effect variables in Model 4 are consistent with the
results of Model 3, except for a small number of firms.
VI.

Conclusion

The regression results support the hypothesis of this study that changes in the economic
environment significantly affect the total risk level faced by U.S. banks. Growth in real GDP,
growth in the money supply and the spread between the yield on the 10 year Treasury note and
Federal Funds Rate in the U.S. are significantly related to a bank’s total risk. The changing
economic environment as a source of bank risk has been overlooked in other studies, but appears
to be relevant based on the results of this study.
In this study, bank size, the equity to asset ratio, allowance for loan loss ratio, liquidity ratio,
loan to asset ratio, growth in real GDP, growth in the money supply and the interest rate spread
all appear to be significantly related to total risk. The size of a bank, allowance for loan loss
ratio, loan to asset ratio and the equity to asset ratio yield results that were consistent with prior
research (Agusman et al., 2008; Jahankhani and Lynge, 1980; Mansur and Zitz, 2003; Lee and
Brewer, 1985). However, the Dividend Payout ratio and the liquidity ratio are found to be
significant in other studies, but the dividend payout ratio is statistically insignificant and the
liquidity ratio is significant but with the opposite sign from what is expected and supported by
prior research. The difference in these results might be explained by the difference between this
study and others. Other research that is mentioned in this paper use 44, 59 and 95 banks while
this study uses a unique data set of 326 banks and spans 30 years as opposed to four. Perhaps,
these ratios have had different effects on total risk, especially in the last decade, which is not
included in prior studies.
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As for future research, the influence of changes in the economic environment can be applied
to market risk, the other major risk topic of research studies. Accounting data have been tested
against both market and total risk. Changes in the economic environment can be regressed
against measures of market risk to determine if a relationship exists there as well. Also, because
this study includes companies that entered in later periods and left in earlier periods, it overlooks
some of the effects associated with mergers and acquisitions. For instance a company might
become incorporated in 1989, but then become acquired by a larger bank in 1994. If sufficient
data is available, a study could be conducted to analyze how mergers and acquisitions affect the
total risk level for banks.

21

Appendix 1: List of Banks included in this Study
1st Source Corp
Crescent Financial Corp
Cape Bancorp Inc
ACNB Corp
Cullen/Frost Bankers Inc
Capital Bank Corp
Alliance Bankshares Corp
CVB Financial Corp
Capital City Bank Group
Alliance Financial Corp
Dearborn Bancorp Inc
Cardinal Financial Corp
DNB Financial Corp
American National Bankshares IncCarolina Bank Holdings Inc
Eagle Bancorp Inc
American River Bankshares
Carrollton Bancorp
East West Bancorp Inc0
Ameris Bancorp
Cascade Bancorp
AmeriServ Financial Inc
Eastern Virginia Bankshares Inc
Cascade Financial Corp
Ames National Corp
ECB Bancorp Inc
Cathay General Bancorp
Annapolis Bancorp Inc
Elmira Savings Bank FSB (The)
Center Bancorp Inc
Arrow Financial Corp
Emclaire Financial Corp
Center Financial Corp
Associated Banc-Corp
Centerstate Banks of Florida Inc Encore Bancshares Inc
Auburn National BanCorp Inc
Enterprise Bancorp Inc/MA
Central Bancorp Inc/MA
BancFirst Corp
Central Pacific Financial Corp0 Enterprise Financial Services Corp
Bancorp Inc (The)
Central Valley Community Bancorp
Evans Bancorp Inc
Bancorp of New Jersey Inc
Central Virginia Bankshares Inc F0N0B0 Corp
Bancorp Rhode Island Inc
Centrue Financial Corp
Farmers Capital Bank Corp
BancorpSouth Inc0
Century BanCorp Inc
Fauquier Bankshares Inc
BancTrust Financial Group Inc
Chemical Financial Corp
Fidelity Bancorp Inc
Bank of America Corp
Cheviot Financial Corp
Fidelity Southern Corp
Bank of Commerce Holdings
Citizens & Northern Corp
Fifth Third Bancorp
Bank of Granite Corp
Citizens First Corp
Financial Institutions Inc
Bank of Hawaii Corp
Citizens Holding Co
First BanCorp (Puerto Rico)
Bank of Marin Bancorp
Citizens Republic Bancorp Inc
First Bancorp Inc/ME (The)
Bank of New York Mellon Corp (The)
City Holding Co
First Bancorp/NC
Bank of South Carolina Corp
City National Corp
First Bancshares Inc (The)/MS
Bank of the Carolinas
CNB Financial Corp/PA
First Busey Corp
Bank of the Ozarks
CoBiz Financial Inc
First Business Financial Services Inc
Banner Corp
Colony Bankcorp Inc
First California Financial Group Inc
Bar Harbor Bankshares
Columbia Banking System Inc
First Capital Bancorp Inc/VA
BB&T Corp
Comerica Inc
First Citizens Banc Corp
Berkshire Bancorp Inc
Commerce Bancshares Inc
First Citizens BancShares Inc
BNC Bancorp
Commercefirst Bancorp Inc
First Commonwealth Financial Corp0
BOK Financial Corp
Commercial National Financial Corp
First Community Bancshares Inc
Boston Private Financial Holdings Commonwealth
Inc
Bankshares Inc First Community Corp
Bridge Bancorp Inc
Community Bank Shares of IndianaFirst
Inc Federal of Northern Michigan
Bancorp
Inc
Bridge Capital Holdings
Community Bank System Inc0
First Financial Bancorp0
Britton & Koontz Capital Corp
Community Capital Corp
Bryn Mawr Bank Corp
Community Central Bank Corp0 First Financial Bankshares Inc
First Financial Corp/IN
C&F Financial Corp
Community Partners Bancorp
First Financial Service Corp
Community Trust Bancorp Inc
Cadence Financial Corp
First Horizon National Corp
Community West Bancshares
Camden National Corp
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First M & F Corp
First Mariner Bancorp
First Merchants Corp
First Midwest Bancorp Inc
First of Long Island Corp (The)
First PacTrust Bancorp Inc
First Security Group Inc
First South Bancorp Inc
First United Corp
First West Virginia Bancorp Inc0
Firstbank Corp
FirstMerit Corp
FNB United Corp
FPB Bancorp Inc
Fulton Financial Corp
German American Bancorp Inc
Glacier Bancorp Inc
Glen Burnie Bancorp
Great Southern Bancorp Inc
Green Bankshares Inc
Guaranty Bancorp
Guaranty Federal Bancshares Inc
Hampton Roads Bankshares Inc
Hancock Holding Co
Hanmi Financial Corp
Harleysville Savings Bank
Hawthorn Bancshares Inc
Heartland Financial USA Inc
Heritage Commerce Corp
Heritage Oaks Bancorp
Home Bancshares Inc
Horizon Bancorp
Hudson Valley Holding Corp
Huntington Bancshares Inc
IBERIABANK Corp
Independent Bank Corp
Independent Bank Corp0
Integra Bank Corp
International Bancshares Corp
Intervest Bancshares Corp0
Jacksonville Bancorp Inc/FL
Jeffersonville Bancorp
JPMorgan Chase & Co

KeyCorp
OptimumBank Holdings Inc
Lakeland Bancorp Inc
Oriental Financial Group Inc
Lakeland Financial Corp
Oritani Financial Corp
Landmark Bancorp Inc
Orrstown Financial Services Inc
LNB Bancorp Inc
PAB Bankshares Inc0
M B T Financial Corp
Pacific Continental Corp
M&T Bank Corp
Pacific Mercantile Bancorp
Macatawa Bank Corp
Pacific Premier Bancorp Inc
MacKinac Financial Corp
PacWest Bancorp
MainSource Financial Group Inc Park National Corp
Marshall & Ilsley Corp
Parke Bancorp Inc
Mayflower Bancorp Inc
Patriot National Bancorp Inc
Mercantile Bancorp Inc/IL
Penns Woods Bancorp Inc
Mercantile Bank Corp
Peoples Bancorp Inc
Merchants Bancshares Inc
Peoples Bancorp of North Carolina Inc0
Metro Bancorp Inc
Peoples Financial Corp/MS
MetroCorp Bancshares Inc
Pinnacle Financial Partners Inc
Mid Penn Bancorp Inc0
PNC Financial Services Group Inc0
Middleburg Financial Corp
Popular Inc
MidSouth Bancorp Inc0
Porter Bancorp Inc
MidWestOne Financial Group Inc Premier Financial Bancorp Inc
Monarch Community Bancorp Inc PremierWest Bancorp
Monarch Financial Holdings Inc Princeton National Bancorp Inc
MutualFirst Financial Inc
PrivateBancorp Inc
Nara Bancorp Inc
Prosperity Bancshares Inc
National Bankshares Inc
QCR Holdings Inc
National Penn Bancshares Inc
Regions Financial Corp
NBT Bancorp Inc
Renasant Corp
New Century Bancorp Inc0
Republic Bancorp Inc
NewAlliance Bancshares Inc
Republic First Bancorp Inc
NewBridge Bancorp
Rockville Financial Inc
Northeast Bancorp
Royal Bancshares of Pennsylvania Inc
Northern States Financial Corp
Rurban Financial Corp
Northern Trust Corp
S&T Bancorp Inc
Northwest Bancshares Inc
S0Y0 Bancorp Inc0
Norwood Financial Corp0
Sandy Spring Bancorp Inc
Oak Ridge Financial Services Inc Savannah Bancorp Inc (The)
Ohio Legacy Corp
SCBT Financial Corp
Ohio Valley Banc Corp0
Seacoast Banking Corp of Florida
Old Line Bancshares Inc
Severn Bancorp Inc
Old National Bancorp
Shore Bancshares Inc
Old Point Financial Corp
Sierra Bancorp
Old Second Bancorp Inc
Signature Bank
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United Bankshares Inc
Simmons First National Corp
United Community Banks Inc
Somerset Hills Bancorp
United Security Bancshares
Southcoast Financial Corp
United Security Bancshares Inc
Southern Community Financial Corp
Southern Connecticut Bancorp Inc United Western Bancorp Inc
Unity Bancorp Inc
Southern First Bankshares Inc
Southern National Bancorp of Virginia
Univest Corp of Pennsylvania
Inc
Valley National Bancorp
Southside Bancshares Inc
Village Bank and Trust Financial Corp
Southwest Bancorp Inc
Virginia Commerce Bancorp
Southwest Georgia Financial Corp VIST Financial Corp
State Bancorp Inc0
VSB Bancorp Inc/NY
State Street Corp
Waccamaw Bankshares Inc
StellarOne Corp
Washington Banking Co
Sterling Bancorp
Washington Trust Bancorp Inc
Sterling Bancshares Inc
Webster Financial Corp
Stewardship Financial Corp
Wells Fargo & Co
Suffolk Bancorp
WesBanco Inc
Summit Financial Group Inc
West Bancorporation Inc
SunTrust Banks Inc0
West Coast Bancorp
Superior Bancorp
Westamerica Bancorporation
Susquehanna Bancshares Inc
Western Alliance Bancorporation
Sussex Bancorp
Whitney Holding Corp0
SVB Financial Group
Wilber Corp
Synovus Financial Corp0
Wilmington Trust Corp
Taylor Capital Group Inc
Wilshire Bancorp Inc
TCF Financial Corp
Wintrust Financial Corp0
Tennessee Commerce Bancorp
WSFS Financial Corp
Texas Capital Bancshares Inc
Yadkin Valley Financial Corp
TIB Financial Corp
Zions Bancorporation
Tidelands Bancshares Inc
Tompkins Financial Corp
Tower Bancorp Inc
Tower Financial Corp
TriCo Bancshares
TrustCo Bank Corp NY
Trustmark Corp
U0S0 Bancorp
UMB Financial Corp
Union Bankshares Inc
Union First Market Bankshares Corp
United Bancorp Inc
United Bancshares Inc/OH
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